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Abstract
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted
firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor gover-
nance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive
to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms
raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and
harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent
with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between
ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
JEL classification: G11, G12, G23
Keywords: Hedge funds, Asset management, Initial public offering, Agency, Conflicts of
interest
1. Introduction
“When a fund management company lists on a stock exchange, its clients are not uniformly
delighted. They are aware that potential conflicts of interest can arise that some companies
fail to manage.”
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–The Financial Times (2012)1
Recent years have witnessed a slew of public listings by mega asset management firms includ-
ing Amundi Group, Man Group, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group, Blackstone Group,
and KKR.2 These publicly listed mega asset managers together managed an impressive $2.38
trillion in 2017. How does the transition to public equity markets impact investment per-
formance? Fund management companies argue that going public allows them to enhance
investment performance by better incentivizing their staff through employee stock options
and by investing the initial public offering (IPO) proceeds in superior technology and busi-
ness support. Moreover, listed firms can be operationally more robust than their unlisted
competitors given the higher transparency required of listed companies. However, fund in-
vestors contend that public listing allows firm founders to sell off their stakes to outsiders,
which exacerbates potential conflicts of interest. For asset managers, the transition to public
markets weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, engen-
dering a rich combination of agency problems, hitherto unexplored in the academic literature,
which could have significant implications for the fund investor. In this paper, we shed light
on these agency issues by investigating the impact on hedge fund performance when asset
management firms go public.
The hedge fund industry is an important and interesting laboratory for studying the
impact of initial public offerings in asset management for three reasons.3 First, hedge funds,
both public and private, typically report monthly return data to commercial databases, al-
lowing researchers to cleanly measure investment performance and evaluate the performance
implications of the private to public transition.4 Second, running a comparable analysis on
1See also Wall Street Journal (2011).
2See, for instance, Bloomberg (2015). By our estimates, at the end of 2013, about 16.68% of hedge fund
industry assets were managed by listed firms.
3According to BarclayHedge, hedge funds collectively managed close to $3 trillion in assets in 2017. See
https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF Money Under Management.html.
4One caveat is that hedge funds do not have to report to the databases. Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh (2013)
find that funds managed by mega hedge fund firms often do not report to commercial databases.
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private equity funds is difficult as performance metrics used in private equity such as internal
rate of return (IRR) or investment multiple are measured over a multi-year horizon, effec-
tively precluding researchers from analyzing the performance implications of the transition
in a timely fashion. Third, while hedge funds typically charge incentive fees and feature
manager co-investment to improve incentive alignment, the potential for agency problems is
greater for hedge funds than for mutual funds owing to the complex strategies employed by
and the lower level of transparency and disclosure of the former.5
Investors in hedge funds and private equity funds (and, to a lesser extent, mutual funds)
that are managed by publicly listed firms need to contend with a combination of agency
issues: the conflicts that surface between management and fund investors (Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik, 2011; Teo, 2011; Aragon and Nanda, 2017) and the conflicts that arise between
firm shareholders and fund investors. A privately held investment firm is often controlled
by its founder-owners, who also invest a substantial portion of their net worth in the funds
managed by the firm. This engenders alignment between ownership, control, and investment
capital. Post-IPO, the founders of the firm sell out to new shareholders who typically do
not invest alongside the limited partners, thus separating ownership from investment capital.
Furthermore, the founders may not reinvest the substantial proceeds from the IPO in the
funds managed by the firm, thereby distancing control from investment capital.6
We find substantial differences in expected returns on the portfolios of hedge funds sorted
by fund management company listing status that are unexplained by the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by listed firms under-perform hedge funds man-
aged by unlisted firms by 2.89% per year (t-statistic = 4.73) after adjusting for covariation
5Consistent with this view, Ferris and Yan (2009) find economically modest performance differences
between mutual funds sorted by firm listing status that are not robust to the risk adjustment methodology.
For example, they find that the Fama and French (1993) alpha spread between mutual funds managed by
publicly listed firms and those managed by private firms is a modest –2.2 basis points per month and is
statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level. Unlike us, Ferris and Yan (2009) do not establish
the link between the under-performance and conflicts of interest. Instead, they assume that the under-
performance is itself supportive of the agency view.
6As a result of the windfall from the IPO, the proportion of the founders’ net worth that is co-invested
in the funds managed by the firm falls, even if the founders do not redeem from the funds post-IPO.
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with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. The results are not confined to the smallest
funds in our sample and cannot be explained by differences in share restrictions and illiquid-
ity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan, 2012), incentives (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009),
fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), fund size (Berk and Green, 2004), return smoothing
behavior (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004), backfill and incubation bias (Liang, 2000;
Fung and Hsieh, 2009; Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst, 2014), and manager manipu-
lation of fund returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Aragon and Nanda, 2017).
Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that, relative to the five-year pre-IPO
period, average fund risk-adjusted performance deteriorates by an annualized 8.40% and
average firm alpha wanes by an annualized 7.20% during the five-year post-IPO period.
Despite the post-event under-performance, public firms harvest annual fee revenues that are
$17.28 million or 54.96% greater than do comparable private firms. Relative to the control
group, public firms are able to grow their assets under management (AUM) by $617.62
million or 77.52% during the same period. The surge in firm AUM stems both from organic
growth in existing fund AUM and from the launch of new funds post listing, suggesting that
the new capital raised goes toward the marketing of existing and new products.
In line with an agency story that derives from conflicts between control and investment
capital, we observe substantial differences in the under-performance for funds sorted on met-
rics that capture the incentive alignment between management and investors. The alpha
spread between funds managed by private versus public firms is smaller for funds with high
manager total deltas (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), better governance scores (Ozik and
Sadka, 2015), and fund manager personal investment. In keeping with an explanation that
relates to conflicts between ownership and investment capital, the short-termist pressures
associated with a stock listing (Poterba and Summers, 1995; Graham, Harvey, and Raj-
gopal, 2005; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015) also drive the under-performance of
publicly traded asset management firms.7 We find that firms with high earnings response
7A focus on short-term quarterly earnings at publicly listed investment firms can hamper their ability to
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coefficients (ERCs) (Ball and Brown, 1968; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989), whose stock prices
are more responsive to earnings, under-perform more than do firms with low ERCs. More-
over, consistent with the overall conflicts of interest view, the under-performance is more
pronounced for firms that exhibit greater separation of ownership, control, and investment
capital post-IPO. Amongst listed firms, those with low insider ownership and whose IPO
prospectuses reveal that existing shareholders cash out under-perform more.
The conflicts of interest can translate into fund under-performance via the drive to gather
assets post-IPO. Equity markets tend to reward revenue growth, which, for investment firms,
generally corresponds to growth in AUM (Pozen and Clay, 2012).8 Short-termist pressures
can also induce excessive asset gathering because asset gathering boosts current fee revenues
(or current earnings) at the expense of future returns (or future earnings). We find, consistent
with the asset gathering view, that the under-performance is most severe for funds with the
lowest liquidity risk exposure (Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003) and, therefore, have the greatest
capacity to gather assets. We also find that high ERC firms raise more capital and launch
more funds than do low ERC firms.
The endogeneity of firm listing does not explain the under-performance of hedge funds
managed by public firms. By analyzing the private to public transition in the event study,
we sidestep concerns that time-invariant differences between public and private firms simul-
taneously explain listing status and fund under-performance. The difference-in-differences
methodology ameliorates concerns that observable time-varying differences in firm charac-
teristics drive our findings. To cater for unobserved time-varying differences between public
and private firms, we run an instrumental variables analysis with the supply of investment
capital at firm founding as the instrument and find that the impact of listing on fund per-
formance is even stronger after instrumenting for listing status. Our choice of instrument
attack long-horizon mispricings (Stein, 2005), thereby limiting investment opportunity and reducing alpha.
8Man Group’s strategy is emblematic of this. According to Man Group finance director Kevin Hayes,
“the Board’s point of view is that at its essence the Man Group’s strategy is a growth strategy. We think
that’s why people invest in us. . . . And when we’re looking therefore at each aspect of our business, we have
to be able to grow it. We have to be able to scale it.” See Pozen and Clay (2012, p. 6).
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follows Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and is robust to alternative specifications.
The results in this paper challenge the view that asset management firms list to enhance
investment performance. In doing so, we resonate with three strands of research on hedge
funds. The first strand examines agency problems and finds that some hedge funds inflate
their December returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011), take on excessive liquidity risk
(Teo, 2011), and strategically delay reporting poor performance (Aragon and Nanda, 2017).9
Our findings indicate that the process of going public heightens conflicts of interest, which
are in turn associated with poorer performance. A second strand sheds light on the drivers
of alpha. We find that, just like motivated (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), emerging
(Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), distinctive (Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012), and attentive (Lu,
Ray, and Teo, 2016) hedge funds, those managed by private firms out-perform. The third
strand uncovers strong direct (Yin, 2016) and indirect (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016)
incentives that drive managers to raise capital. Our results suggest that public firms are
even more motivated to gather assets.
This paper enriches the literature on initial public offerings. Going public crimps indus-
try competitor performance (Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl, 2010), biases issuers of credit ratings
(Kedia, Rajgopal, and Zhou, 2014), hurts firm internal innovation (Bernstein, 2015), and
reduces the sensitivity of corporate investment to opportunities (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and
Ljungqvist, 2015). Yet, little is known about the effect of going public on fund investment
performance. Our work addresses this important gap. Our findings are distinct from papers
that find that IPO firms suffer from poor long-run post-issue operating performance (Jain
and Kini, 1994) and stock returns (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Unlike those papers, which
analyze the conflicts between shareholders and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Jensen, 1989), we focus on the conflicts between fund investors and management / share-
holders. We show that while listed asset managers deliver lower returns, which hurt fund
9Jorion and Schwarz (2014) argue that the discontinuity at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution
shown by Bollen and Pool (2009) is not evidence of manager manipulation.
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investors, they are able to grow fee revenues, which benefits shareholders.
Our findings echo work on ownership-driven conflicts of interest at mutual funds. For
example, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) find evidence of strategic cross-fund subsidization
within mutual fund families. Golez and Marin (2015) show that mutual funds owned by banks
provide price support for their affiliated banks through their trading activities. Banks in turn
leak valuable information derived from their lending activities to their affiliated mutual funds
(Massa and Rehman, 2008) and assign favorable ratings, through their analysts, to the stocks
that are held by those mutual funds (Mola and Guidolin, 2009). Unlike those studies, we
investigate conflicts of interest stemming from changes in the ownership structure of asset
management firms and analyze how those changes relate to fund investors.
Our work complements a nascent literature on ownership stakes in hedge funds, which
reports conflicting results on the performance of hedge funds with external owners. On
one hand, Mullally (2017) finds that hedge funds that sell significant ownership stakes to
outsiders do not under-perform. He contends that external owners in general have strong
incentives to monitor their funds. On the other hand, Yan and Zheng (2017) show that
conditional on those outside owners being financial firms, hedge funds subsequently under-
perform, which they attribute to a conflicts of interest story. In our sample, we exclude
firms that go public simply because they are bought out by listed companies. Therefore, our
results are not driven by the external owner or by the financial firm affiliation effect. We
argue that an IPO offers a more robust setting for investigating conflicts of interest in hedge
fund firms given that the new minority shareholders of a publicly listed firm typically neither
invest in the funds under management nor have control rights over the firm. Conversely, in
an ownership transfer, the new stakeholder often acquires control rights while simultaneously
supplying capital to the funds managed by the firm.10
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical results, and Section 4 presents a battery of
10See, for example, the seed relationships described in Cohen and Delacey (2005, p. 7).
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robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
We evaluate hedge funds using monthly net of fee returns and assets under management
data of live and dead hedge funds reported in the TASS, Hedge Fund Research (HFR), and
BarclayHedge data sets from January 1994 to December 2013. Because TASS, HFR, and
BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994, the data sets do not contain information
on funds that died before January 1994. This gives rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate
this bias by focusing on data from January 1994 onward.
Our fund universe has a total of 30,509 hedge funds, of which 12,380 are live funds
and 18,129 are dead funds. Due to concerns that funds with multiple share classes could
cloud the analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes from the sample.11 This leaves a
total of 16,592 hedge funds, of which 5,947 are live funds and 10,645 are dead funds at
the end of our sample period. The funds are roughly evenly split between TASS, HFR,
and BarclayHedge. While 5,547 funds appear in multiple databases, many funds belong
to only one database. There are 3,597, 3,446, and 4,002 funds unique to the TASS, HFR,
and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining data
from more than one source. In addition to monthly return and size information, our sample
captures data on fund characteristics such as management fee, performance fee, redemption
period, lock-up period, investment style, leverage indicator, high-water mark indicator, and
fund age.12
We collect the fund management companies’ public listing status from several sources:
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) In-
11Inferences do not change when we include multiple share classes of the same fund in the analysis. To
merge databases, we follow the procedure outlined in the Appendix of Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski, and Tolonen
(2017).
12To ameliorate the impact of return outliers, we trim the hedge fund returns in our sample at the 99.5th
and 0.5th percentiles. The baseline results are virtually unchanged when we use the original returns reported
in the databases or when we winsorize the returns at the 99.5th and 0.5th percentiles.
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vestment Adviser Public Disclosure website, Factiva, and the fund management companies’
websites.13 For each fund management company, we perform a search in S&P Capital IQ and
SEC’s Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, which provide information about the company’s
current and prior corporate parents. Once we identify a parent and subsidiary relation, we
obtain the effective public listing date for the fund management company by checking the
M&A/Private Placements section in S&P Capital IQ, conducting a Factiva news search, and
perusing the corporate history from the fund management company’s website.
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics on the number of listed firms as well as the
number of hedge funds and the assets that they manage by year. While the number of listed
fund management companies is small relative to the number of unlisted fund management
companies, listed fund management companies manage a growing number of hedge funds
and pool of assets. In 1994, only 12 listed firms were managing 39 hedge funds and $2.55
billion or 4.02% of industry assets. In 2013, the number of listed firms has grown to 113.
These firms manage 856 hedge funds and $199.34 billion or 16.68% of industry assets, a
significant increase relative to the start of the sample period.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Following Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2017), we classify hedge funds into 12
investment styles: Commodity Trading Advisor, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Global
Macro, Long Only, Long/Short, Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Relative Value, Sector,
Short Bias, and Others. Panel B of Table 1 reports the number and percentage of funds
managed by listed versus unlisted firms stratified by investment style.14 It indicates that,
relative to private hedge funds, a greater proportion of public hedge funds are Long Only
and Multi-Strategy funds and a smaller proportion are Commodity Trading Advisor and
13See http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd Search.aspx for the SEC’s Investment
Adviser Public Disclosure website.
14The total number of funds reported in Panel B of Table 1 (15,351) is smaller than that for the full
sample (16,592) as we exclude funds with missing investment strategy information, funds managed by firms
acquired by listed entities, and funds for which firm listing status is unclear.
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Event Driven funds.
Our firm sample covers a broad spectrum of fund management companies including large
asset management houses that also manage private equity funds and mutual funds. This
allows us to shed light on the impact of public listing on the asset management industry in
general. One concern is that, for some of these firms, their hedge fund assets could be a
relatively small part of their business. Consequently, the impact of hedge fund performance,
fee revenues, and AUM on these firms can be relatively muted. To ameliorate such concerns,
as a robustness test, we follow Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and discard firms for which
hedge fund assets make up only a small part of their aggregated institutional portfolio. We
first check whether a firm is registered as an investment adviser with the SEC. Registration is
a prerequisite for conducting non-hedge fund business. If a firm is not registered, we include
it in our pure play sample. If a firm is registered, we obtain its registration documents
(Form ADV). For a registered firm to be included in our pure play hedge fund firm sample,
we require that it charges performance-based fees and that at least 50% of its clients are
“Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High net worth individuals.” This
leaves a total of 96 listed and 1,888 unlisted pure play firms at the end of the sample period.
In results that are available upon request, we find that our baseline results prevail when we
analyze only pure play hedge fund firms.
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009).
These biases stem from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a
result, a self-selection bias exists. For instance, funds often undergo an incubation period
during which they rely on internal funding before seeking capital from outside investors. In-
cubated funds with successful track records then go on to list in various hedge fund databases
while the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias. Separate from this, when
a fund is listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing date. Again, because
successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, these backfilled
returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In our analysis, we repeat the
10
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tests after dropping the first 24 months of return data from each fund to ensure that the
results are robust to backfill and incubation bias. To fully address concerns about backfill
bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we also redo the tests
after removing all return observations that have been backfilled prior to fund listing date.
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the S&P 500 index
(SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the difference between the
Russell 2000 and the S&P 500 indexes; the yield spread of the US ten-year Treasury bond
over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration of the ten-year bond (BD10RET);
the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the ten-year Treasury bond, also
appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY); and the excess returns on portfolios of
lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds
(PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum possible return from trend
following strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on their respective underlying assets. These
seven factors have been shown by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory
power on hedge fund returns.
3. Empirical results
3.1. Tests of fund performance
To begin, we test for differences in risk-adjusted performance between funds managed
by listed and unlisted management companies. Every year, starting in January 1994, two
hedge fund portfolios are formed by sorting funds on management company listing status.
The post-formation returns on these two portfolios over the next 12 months are linked across
years to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of
the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2, reveal substantial differences in expected
returns, on the portfolios sorted by management company listing status, that are unexplained
11
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by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors. Hedge funds managed by listed companies
under-perform those managed by unlisted firms by a statistically significant but modest
1.89% per year (t-statistic = 3.13). After adjusting for covariation with the factors from
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the spread increases to an economically significant 2.89%
per year (t-statistic = 4.73).15 As in the rest of the paper, we base statistical inferences
on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Because hedge funds with
investor capital below $20 million perhaps are not relevant to large institutional investors,
we conduct the portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds with at least $20 million of AUM.
The results reported in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that our findings are not driven by small
funds.16
[Insert Table 2 near here]
Fig. 1 complements the results from Panel A of Table 2. It illustrates the monthly
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from the portfolio of funds managed by listed firms
(Portfolio A) and the portfolio of funds managed by unlisted firms (Portfolio B). CAR is the
cumulative difference between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings (estimated
over the entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. The
CARs in Fig. 1 indicate that Portfolio A consistently under-performs Portfolio B over the
entire sample period and suggest that the under-performance of funds managed by listed
firms is not peculiar to a particular year.
[Insert Fig. 1 near here]
Concerns could arise that the portfolio sort results are driven by shareholder activists
as activists that are managed by listed firms could be less willing to exert strong pressure
15The portfolio sort results are robust to value weighting the funds within each portfolio. The risk-adjusted
spread for the value-weighted sort is 2.75% per annum (t-statistic = 4.20).
16The portfolio sort results are not driven solely by the under-performance of funds launched post IPO
by listed firms. We redo our portfolio sort with only funds that were conceived prior to firm listing and
find that these funds post firm IPO under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms by 2.54% per year after
adjusting for risk (t-statistic = 2.72). Funds launched post-IPO under-perform funds launched pre-IPO, but
the performance spread is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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on portfolio companies to make shareholder-friendly changes given that they themselves
are vulnerable to shareholder activism. To address such concerns, we identify shareholder
activist funds in our sample based on strategy name, substrategy name, fund name, and fund
investment strategy description. In total, 95 shareholder activist funds are in our sample.
After removing shareholder activists, we find that funds managed by listed firms still under-
perform those managed by unlisted firms by 2.85% per annum (t-statistic = 4.66) after
adjusting for risk.
To further test the performance difference between funds managed by listed and unlisted
management companies, we estimate the following pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression:
ALPHAim = a+bLISTEDim+cMGTFEEi+dPERFFEEi+eNOTICEi+fMININVi
+ glog(SIZEim−1) + hAGEim +
∑
k
pkSTY LEDUMki +
∑
l
qlY EARDUM lim + im, (1)
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away covariation with the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, LISTED is an indicator variable that takes a value of
one when a fund is managed by a listed firm and a value of zero otherwise, MGTFEE is fund
management fee in percentage, PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE
is fund redemption notification period in months, MININV is fund minimum investment in
millions of US dollars, SIZE is fund AUM in millions of US dollars, AGE is fund age in
decades, STYLEDUM is the fund style dummy, and YEARDUM is the year dummy. Fund
alpha is one-month abnormal return from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, with the factor
loadings estimated over the prior 24 months.17 We also estimate the analogous regression on
raw monthly fund returns to ensure that our findings are not artefacts of the risk adjustment
methodology. We base statistical inferences on robust standard errors that are clustered by
17Inferences do not change when we use factor loadings estimated over the past 36 months to calculate
alpha instead.
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fund, which are White (1980) standard errors that adjust for dependence at the fund level.
The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis, reported in Columns 1 to 4 of Ta-
ble 3, corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts. The coefficient estimate on LISTED
in the alpha regression reported in Column 4 indicates that, controlling for other factors that
could explain fund performance, funds managed by listed companies under-perform funds
managed by unlisted companies by 2.42% per annum after adjusting for risk. Inferences do
not change when we estimate the regression on raw returns suggesting that our prior findings
are not driven by our risk adjustment technology. The coefficient estimates on the control
variables accord with the extant literature. Higher powered incentives or performance fees
(Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009) and longer redemption notice periods (Aragon, 2007) are
associated with superior performance, and fund age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) is linked to
poorer performance. The impact of fund size on performance is more ambiguous. While size
is associated with lower returns (Berk and Green, 2004), it is also linked to higher alphas.18
[Insert Table 3 near here]
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of the
OLS regressions. First, we run cross-sectional regressions for each month. Then, we report
the time series averages of the coefficient estimates and use the time series standard errors
of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and MacBeth regressions control for
correlation in residuals across different firms within the same month. We compute Newey
and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag to adjust for dependence across
time.19 The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results reported in Columns 5 to 8 of Table 3 echo
our previous findings and indicate that they are robust to alternative model specifications.
18Diseconomies of scale at the firm level do not explain our findings. In unreported results (available upon
request), we show that the pooled OLS regression findings are robust to including the log of lagged firm
AUM as an additional independent variable. Our findings are also robust to including the log of fund age
as opposed to fund age as one of the independent variables.
19Inferences do not change when we compute Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a longer 24-
month lag instead. The coefficient estimates on LISTED are still significant at the 1% level for both the
univariate and the multivariate Fama and MacBeth regressions with fund alpha as the dependent variable.
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One concern is that funds managed by listed firms could take on less leverage than do
funds managed by unlisted firms. This can explain the under-performance of the former
relative to the latter. To address this concern, we reestimate the Eq. (1) regressions with
fund information ratio in place of fund alpha. Information ratio is fund alpha divided by the
standard deviation of fund residuals from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model estimated over
the past 24 months. In results that are available upon request, we find that the coefficient
estimates on LISTED in the OLS regressions on information ratio are negative and statis-
tically significant at the 1% level. After controlling for the other factors that could drive
fund information ratio, funds managed by listed firms deliver information ratios that are
on average 0.228 lower than do funds managed by unlisted firms. Inferences do not change
when we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on fund information ratio.
3.2. Event study
To complement the baseline portfolio sorts, we conduct an event study to investigate
fund performance and AUM before and after firm listing. We choose as the event window
the period starting 60 months prior to the IPO and ending 60 months after the IPO.20 To
be included in the sample, a fund must have monthly return information during the period
that starts 36 months pre-IPO and ends 36 months post-IPO. This leaves 27 funds that
belong to 16 firms with sufficient return information. To account for endogeneity concerns
driven by observable differences between listed and unlisted firms, we match event hedge
funds with non-event hedge funds based on fund performance and AUM in the 36-month
pre-IPO period and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. For example, in the fund
alpha analysis, event funds are matched to non-event funds by minimizing the sum of the
absolute differences in monthly fund alpha in the 36-month pre-IPO period. Panel A of Table
4 reports differences in fund alpha and AUM before and after the IPO relative to the matched
sample. We also match event firms with non-event firms based on firm performance, firm
20Our difference-in-differences results are robust to using an event window that starts 48 months prior to
the IPO and ends 48 months after the IPO.
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AUM, firm revenue, and number of funds per firm, and we report the results from difference-
in-differences analyses of these firm attributes in Panel B of Table 4.21
[Insert Table 4 near here]
The results reported in Table 4 indicate that, relative to the five-year period before
IPO and to a matched sample of funds, fund risk-adjusted performance deteriorates by an
annualized 8.40% during the five-year period following the IPO.22 The reduction in fund
performance is economically meaningful and statistically significant at the 1% level.23 At
the same time and relative to comparable firms, listed firm risk-adjusted performance wanes
by an annualized 7.20%. These results suggest that the drop in performance could be driven
more by the smaller funds managed by listed firms.
Do the lower alphas of listed firms translate into lower fee revenues for these asset man-
agement companies? We find that, despite the deterioration in performance, relative to
their unlisted competitors, listed firms harvest annual fee revenues that are $17.28 million
or 54.96% greater post-listing. This is because compared with the control group, they grow
their AUM by $617.62 million or 77.52% during the same period. The surge in firm AUM
stems both from organic growth in existing fund AUM and from the launch of new funds post
21Inferences do not change when we match event and non-event funds based on fund age and analyze fund
alpha.
22To reconcile the results from the event study (Table 4) with those of the portfolio sort (Table 2), we
rerun the portfolio sort with only funds from the event study sample, i.e., funds with at least 36 months
of return information pre- and post-firm IPO. The results indicate that for this group of funds, the alpha
spread between funds managed by unlisted firms and those managed by listed firms is 10.98% per annum.
This is consistent with the magnitude of the alpha spread reported in Table 4.
23Concerns could arise that the significant difference-in-differences result may be driven by the 29 basis
point monthly alpha spread between the treatment and control funds in the pre-event period. This per-
formance spread is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 10% level. Nonetheless, to address such
concerns, we perform an alternative two-stage matching procedure. First, we limit the sample of possible
matching funds to those that lie within the 10th percentile of the funds that are closest to the treatment
fund based on average monthly alpha in the pre-event period. Next, within this group of funds, we choose
the fund that minimizes the sum of the absolute differences in monthly fund alpha. The 10th percentile
cutoff is chosen from a set of possible cutoffs in 5% increments, i.e., {5, 10, 15, ..., 95}, to minimize the alpha
spread between the treatment and control group in the pre-event period. This two-stage matching procedure
reduces the pre-event alpha spread to a modest 9 basis points per month (t-statistic = 0.48). Moreover, the
difference-in-differences is still significant at -70 basis points per month (t-statistic = -2.40). These results
are available upon request.
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listing. After listing, existing fund AUM ratchets up by $84.41 million or 31.26% relative to
comparable funds. At the same time, the number of funds per firm increases from 4.26 to
8.21, which is 4.19 funds per firm greater than for comparable firms. This suggests that the
capital raised via the IPO goes toward the marketing of existing products and the launching
of new products.
Are listed firms more likely to conceive additional hedge funds after controlling for other
factors that drive fund launch? To investigate, we estimate probit regressions on the proba-
bility of launching a new hedge fund in a given year. We include as independent variables an
indicator variable for whether a firm is listed, as well as controls for past firm performance
over the previous year, the number of funds already launched by the firm, standard deviation
of monthly firm returns over the previous year, aggregate firm flow over the previous year,
firm management fee, firm performance fee, firm notice period, firm minimum investments,
firm age, and the log of firm size. Firm management fee is simply the value-weighted average
management fee of the funds managed by the firm. The other firm attributes are constructed
analogously.
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that firms are more likely to raise additional funds
post-IPO. The marginal effect from the regression with firm return as a control variable
indicates that listing increases the probability that a firm will launch a new fund by 3.27
percentage points. In any given year, the unconditional probability that a firm will launch
a new fund is 10.67 percentage points. So, listing increases the chance that a firm will raise
a new fund by 30.65%. The coefficient estimates on the other independent variables yield
interesting insights. They indicate that firms that are larger, are younger, set more investor-
friendly redemption notification terms, and conceived many funds before are more likely to
launch additional funds.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
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3.3. Conflicts between investment capital and control
The results in Subsection 3.2 are consistent with the view that principal-agent problems
drive fund behavior around firm IPOs. To investigate further, we stratify funds based on
metrics that moderate conflicts between fund management and investors at hedge funds and
then redo the portfolio sorts. We condition on past fund manager total delta. Agarwal,
Daniel, and Naik (2009) argue that managers who are operating close to their high water-
marks, and hence have higher manager total deltas, are more aligned with their investors.
We also condition on the Ozik and Sadka (2015) governance measure, which is based on
whether a fund is an onshore fund, features a high-water mark, is registered with the SEC,
was audited in the past, and employs a top auditor or legal counsel.24 As per Ozik and Sadka
(2015), we group funds into high aggregate governance funds, i.e., funds with aggregate gov-
ernance scores greater than or equal to four (out of five), and low aggregate governance
funds, i.e., funds with aggregate governance scores less than or equal to one (out of five).
We further condition on fund manager personal investment, which aligns manager interests
with those of investors and has been used by researchers to study conflicts of interest in
hedge funds (see, e.g., Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2009)). Higher manager
total deltas, better fund governance, and manager personal investment should ameliorate
the agency problems faced by listed asset management firms and, therefore, help narrow the
investment performance gap between listed and unlisted firms.
We report in Panels A to C of Table 6 the results from the baseline portfolio sorts after
stratifying funds by the above-mentioned metrics. We find that the alpha spreads between
funds managed by listed and unlisted firms are smaller for funds with greater incentive align-
ment, i.e., funds with high manager total deltas in the previous year, better governance, and
manager co-investment. These results lend credence to the view that the under-performance
of listed firms is linked to the conflicts between control and investment capital.
24See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of 100 largest law firms by revenue for the top law firms and
http://www.accountingmajors.com/accountingmajors/articles/top100.html for the top accounting firms.
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[Insert Table 6 near here]
3.4. Conflicts between investment capital and ownership
Is the under-performance of funds managed by listed firms also linked to the conflicts
between fund investors and firm shareholders? An emphasis on short-term quarterly earnings
at public investment firms would hamper their ability to correct long-horizon mispricings in
the market (Stein, 2005), thereby limiting the investment opportunity set and reducing
alpha.
To test, we follow Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and compute earnings
response coefficients (Ball and Brown, 1968; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). ERCs mea-
sure the sensitivity of stock returns to firm earnings. We compute ERCs using firm-level
regressions for all listed firms with at least eight quarters of earnings information from the
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). To increase the precision of our estimates
and conserve the number of observations, firm ERCs are estimated using information that
span the full sample period. If short-termism explains fund under-performance, then the
under-performance should be concentrated in funds managed by firms with high ERCs.
We find that high ERC firms drive the under-performance of funds managed by listed
firms. The results reported in Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix indicate that after ad-
justing for covariation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the high ERC portfolio
(Portfolio A1) under-performs the unlisted portfolio (Portfolio B) by 2.68% per year (t-
statistic = 3.13) and the low ERC portfolio (Portfolio A2) delivers a risk-adjusted return
that is statistically indistinguishable from that of the unlisted portfolio.
3.5. Separation of investment capital, ownership, and control post-IPO
If the separation of investment capital, ownership, and control truly drives the under-
performance of funds managed by listed firms, the results should be strongest for funds
belonging to public firms in which the founders unloaded most of their stakes. In such firms,
the level of insider ownership should be low. Therefore, we argue that public firms with few
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insider owners and few closely held shares experience the greatest separation of ownership,
control, and investment capital. Next, we sort funds managed by listed firms based on the
number of insider owners and the number of closely held shares. We obtain data on insider
owners from Form ADV Schedule A and B and information on closely held shares from
Datastream. We define an insider owner as a member of the fund management team who
owns, either directly or indirectly, at least 5% of the fund management company.
The sort results reported in Panels D and E of Table 6 indicate that, relative to funds
managed by unlisted firms, hedge funds managed by listed firms with no insider owners
under-perform by 2.58% per annum (t-statistic = 3.16) after adjusting for risk, and those
managed by listed firms with at least one insider owner out-perform by 0.05% per annum
(t-statistic = 0.02) after adjusting for risk. Similarly, relative to funds managed by unlisted
firms, funds managed by listed firms with few closely held shares (as a proportion of the
total number of shares outstanding) under-perform more than do funds managed by listed
firms with many closely held shares. The risk-adjusted under-performance of the former is
3.44% per annum (t-statistic = 5.07) and that of the latter is 2.31% per annum (t-statistic
= 2.67). These results buttress the conflicts of interest view.
We also sort funds managed by listed firms based on whether they reveal in their IPO
prospectuses that their existing shareholders will cash out. We obtain IPO prospectuses from
the Perfect Information filings database. Out of the 41 investment firms for which we have
prospectuses, 23 firms reveal either directly or indirectly that existing shareholders will cash
out during the IPO. The results reported in Panel F of Table 6 indicate that, in line with
the conflicts of interest explanation, the under-performance is driven by listed firms whose
existing shareholders cashed out during the IPO. After adjusting for risk, funds managed
by listed firms in which existing shareholders cashed out under-perform funds managed by
unlisted firms by 4.58% per year (t-statistic = 2.86), and those managed by listed firms in
which existing shareholders did not cash out under-perform their unlisted competitors by a
modest 0.27% per year (t-statistic = 0.35).
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3.6. Asset gathering
How do the conflicts of interest that surface post-IPO engender fund under-performance?
Fund management companies that go public can under-perform as they are focused on gath-
ering assets and therefore either are less motivated to build on their successful track records
(because they are busy exploiting them) or are simply distracted by the demands associated
with growing their businesses. Researchers have shown that manager motivation (Agarwal,
Daniel, and Naik, 2009; Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010) and inattention (Lu, Ray, and Teo,
2016) impact performance. Recent work has argued that, in the absence of personal capital,
strong direct (Yin, 2016) and indirect (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016) incentives drive
hedge fund managers to raise capital. Equity markets tend to reward revenue growth, and,
for investment firms, revenue growth generally corresponds to growth in AUM. Moreover,
capital markets value stable and predictable earnings. This can encourage asset manage-
ment firms to trade volatile performance fee revenues for relatively stable management fee
revenues by growing AUM (Pozen and Clay, 2012). We find from the results in Table 4 that,
relative to their unlisted counterparts, listed firms raise more capital and are more likely
launch new funds.
We argue that for the asset gathering view to hold, under-performance must be concen-
trated among funds that have the greatest scope or potential for gathering assets. Hedge
funds that take on lower liquidity risk are less susceptible to capacity constraints (Berk and
Green, 2004) and, therefore, have greater potential for gathering assets. We thus sort funds
based on their liquidity risk as captured by fund historical Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liq-
uidity beta and redo the baseline portfolio sorts. Fund historical liquidity beta is estimated
in the presence of the factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, using the past 24
months of data. Five hedge fund groups are formed every January 1, starting in 1996, based
on fund historical Pa´stor and Stambaugh liquidity beta. For each of these five groups, hedge
funds are sorted into two portfolios based on fund management company listing status. The
post-formation returns on these ten portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across
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years to form a single return series for each portfolio.
Table IA2 in the Internet Appendix reports the baseline portfolio sorts on five groups of
funds stratified by fund historical Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity beta. Consistent
with the asset gathering view, the performance differential between funds managed by listed
firms and those managed by unlisted firms is greatest for funds that take on lower liquidity
risk and, therefore, have fewer constraints on growth. After adjusting for covariation with
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the under-performance of the funds managed by
listed firms (relative to those managed by unlisted firms) is 6.66% per annum (t-statistic =
4.81) for funds in the lowest liquidity beta quintile and only 2.89% per annum (t-statistic =
1.64) for funds in the highest liquidity beta quintile.
The advantage of our setup is that it captures ex ante the intent to raise capital. Actual
capital raised ex post is less useful for our purposes because it is both a function of past fund
performance (Agarwal, Green, and Ren, 2018) via the flow-performance relation and a de-
terminant of future fund performance via capacity constraints. Nonetheless, in untabulated
results, we also sort funds managed by listed firms into portfolios based on the firm annual-
ized AUM percentage growth post-IPO and find that the under-performance is concentrated
in funds managed by firms that have aggressively raised capital post-IPO. Funds managed by
firms with above median AUM growth post-IPO under-perform funds managed by unlisted
firms by 3.21% per annum (t-statistic = 3.96) after adjusting for risk. Conversely, funds
managed by firms with below median AUM growth post-IPO under-perform funds managed
by unlisted firms only by 0.99% per annum (t-statistic = 0.84) after accounting for risk.
Short-termist pressures can also induce excessive asset gathering because asset gathering
boosts current fee revenues (or current firm earnings) at the expense of future returns (or
future earnings). In results that are available upon request, we find using a probit regression
on the probability of fund launch post-firm listing that, in any given year, high ERC firms
are 37% more likely to launch new funds than are low ERC firms. Furthermore, high ERC
firms raise more capital than do low ERC firms. In spite of their under-performance, high
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ERC firms manage on average $789.47 million more than do low ERC firms.
3.7. Endogeneity of firm listing status
Does the endogeneity of firm listing engender the under-performance of hedge funds
managed by public firms? Systematic differences can exist between firms that list and those
that do not. These differences could impact both the propensity to list and fund investment
performance. The event study in Subsection 3.2., by analyzing within-firm variation in listing
status, addresses concerns that the spread in investment performance could be driven by
time-invariant differences between private and public firms. Furthermore, the difference-in-
differences methodology that we employ in the event study allows us to ameliorate concerns
that observed time-varying differences between listed and unlisted firms explain our results.
Still, the event study leaves open the possibility that unobserved time-varying differences
between public and private firms could simultaneously affect the decision to go public and
fund investment performance. To address this concern, we conduct an instrumental variables
analysis. The instrument that we use, i.e., firm strategy flow at founding, is motivated by
the Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) choice of venture capital supply at founding
to instrument for firm listing status. Firm strategy flow at founding is the strategy flow of
the first fund conceived by the firm in the two-year period post-firm inception.25 We argue
that the ability to attract capital at inception allows a firm to quickly reach critical mass
and sets the stage for a possible public listing several years later. The first-stage results in
Column 1 of Table 7 confirm this prediction. The supply of capital around the time of firm
founding is a positive and significant predictor of a firm’s listing status with an F-statistic
of 31.81.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
25Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) use as their instrument the total number of firms receiving
first-round venture capital funding in a firm’s headquarter state two years after a firm was funded. Likewise,
we use firm strategy flow in the two-year period after firm inception. We obtain similar inferences when we
use firm strategy flow during the one-year period before inception or firm strategy flow during the one-year
period after inception as alternative instruments.
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The exclusion restriction is that conditional on covariates, firm strategy flow in the two-
year period after inception affects fund investment performance only through its impact
on a firm’s listing status. One concern is that early firm strategy flow can drive future
strategy returns via strategy-level capacity constraints (Naik, Ramadorai, and Stro¨mqvist,
2007). However, the median firm age at listing in our sample of eight years helps alleviate
this concern.26 Capital accumulation between six to eight years earlier should have little
impact on a fund’s investment performance today. As in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) and Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2015), we rely on the separation of time to motivate
the exclusion requirement. In unreported results, we find that higher strategy flow over the
last two years is not a reliable harbinger of lower future strategy returns. Therefore, our use
of strategy flow as opposed to AUM allows us to sidestep concerns related to strategy-level
capacity constraints.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7, we report the second-stage results for the fund return
and alpha equations, respectively. After instrumenting for firm listing status, hedge funds
managed by publicly listed firms continue to under-perform those managed by private firms.
A comparison with the equivalent na¨ıve OLS estimates in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 7
indicates that the point estimates are larger in absolute terms after instrumenting for listing
status. These findings suggest that endogeneity is unlikely to drive our results.
4. Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct a battery of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our
empirical results.
4.1. Backfill bias
Funds managed by unlisted firms can backfill their returns more often than do funds
managed by listed firms. In response to concerns about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj,
26For the instrumental variables analysis, to accommodate our choice of instrument, we remove all firms
that list within two years of firm inception.
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Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we confine the analysis to TASS and HFR
funds for which we have the date that the fund listed on the databases (only TASS and HFR
provide this information). Next, we redo the baseline Table 2 portfolio sort for this subset
of funds and for those returns at or after the respective fund listing date. As not enough
funds report returns post-listing in the cross section during the earlier years, we perform the
analysis for the period after 1996. As shown in Panel A of Table 8, our inferences remain
unchanged when we control for backfill bias in this fashion. Inferences remain unchanged
when, as an alternative, we remove the first 24 months of returns for all funds to adjust for
backfill and incubation bias.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
The Eq. (1) regression results are robust to adjusting for backfill bias. When we estimate
the OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions on the TASS and HFR fund performance post-
listing (on the databases), the coefficient estimates on LISTED are economically meaningful
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Inferences do not change when we include
BarclayHedge funds after removing the first 24 months of returns in the regression sample.
These results are available upon request.
4.2. Serial correlation
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for infre-
quently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or deliberate performance-
smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that we use to make infer-
ences. To allay such concerns, we unsmooth fund returns using the algorithm of Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 2 portfolio sort. The results reported in Panel
B of Table 8 indicate that our findings are not driven by serial correlation.
4.3. Pre-fee returns
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees. If funds managed by listed firms charge higher
fees than do funds managed by unlisted firms, this can explain the under-performance of the
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former. To check, we follow the algorithm outlined in Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik (2009) and back out pre-fee fund returns. As shown in Panel C of Table 8, the baseline
portfolio sort spreads are even greater when we analyze pre-fee fund returns.
4.4. Dynamic risk exposures
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios perhaps do not stay constant
over time. As a result, the risk-adjustment could potentially not be accurate. To account for
dynamic factor loadings, we calculate the factor loadings using a rolling 24-month window
and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns one-month forward. The results
reported in Panel D of Table 8 indicate that inferences remain unchanged after catering for
dynamic risk exposures.
4.5. Omitted risk factors
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud inferences from the portfolio sort
analysis. Relative to funds managed by listed firms, those managed by unlisted firms could
be loading up more on some risk factor (e.g., emerging markets) that did well over the
sample period. To ameliorate such concerns, we augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
with an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return.
To cater for exposure to option-based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001), we augment
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the out-of-the-money S&P 500 call and put option-
based factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model. Finally, to account for exposure
to liquidity risk (Teo, 2011; Aragon and Strahan, 2012; Sadka, 2012), we supplement the
Fung and Hsieh model with the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The results
presented in Panels E, F, and G of Table 8 indicate that our baseline results are not driven
by omitted risk factors.
4.6. Fund termination
Concerns exist that, because funds that terminated their operations could have stopped
reporting returns prematurely, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. To allay such con-
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cerns, we assume that, for the month after a fund liquidates, its return is –10%. As shown
in Panel H of Table 8, with the adjustment for fund termination, the alphas of the portfolios
in the baseline sort fall but the spread remains economically and statistically significant.
We also experiment with more extreme termination returns of –20% and –30% and obtain
qualitatively similar results.
4.7. Subsample analysis
To understand how the under-performance of funds managed by listed firms varies over
time, we split the sample period into two subperiods: January 1994 to December 2003
and January 2004 to December 2013. Next, we redo the Table 2 portfolio sort for each
subperiod. The results in Panels I and J of Table 8 indicate that our findings are robust
across subperiods.
4.8. Manager manipulation of fund returns
Funds managed by listed firms, due to the higher level of transparency required of them,
could be less inclined to inflate their returns than are funds managed by unlisted firms. This
could explain the apparent under-performance of the former when we analyze self-reported
returns from commercial hedge fund databases. To address this concern, we construct firm
returns from firm stock holdings reported in the Thomson Financial 13-F holdings data
and redo the baseline portfolio sorts with firm returns. We argue that less scope exists for
manipulation in the verifiable 13-F filings data that are reported to the SEC. The number
of firms at the end of our sample falls by 88% when we analyze the sample of firm returns
derived from stock holdings data.27 Nonetheless, the results reported in Panel K of Table 8
indicate that our findings remain robust.
27Our sample of hedge funds also includes funds that invest exclusively in non-US equities such as Euro-
pean focused funds as well as small equity long/short funds that have less than $100 million in US equity
exposure and are therefore not required to report their quarterly holdings to the SEC. In addition, the
sample covers other funds that, given their investment style mandate, do not necessarily have single-stock
exposure. Examples of such funds are fixed income, distressed debt, and macro funds, as well as commodity
trading advisors.
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Another way to address manager manipulation is to use the manipulation-proof perfor-
mance measure (MPPM) proposed by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007). In
that effort, we compute MPPM for the hedge funds in our sample based on rolling 24 months
of return information and redo the baseline Eq. (1) regressions with fund MPPM in place of
fund alpha. We find that, for all values of ρ ∈ {2, 3, 4} used in the computation of MPPM,
the coefficient estimates on LISTED in the OLS and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions
are positive and statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
4.9. Style-adjusted returns
Funds managed by listed firms often engage in different investment strategies relative
to funds managed by unlisted firms (see Panel B of Table 1). The Fung and Hsieh model
perhaps does not adequately capture the risk exposures of the portfolios in the baseline sort
given the heterogeneity in investment styles. In response to such concerns, we redo the
baseline portfolio sort with style-adjusted return. Fund style-adjusted return is simply the
return of a fund minus the average return of the funds in the same investment style for that
month. The results reported in Panel L of Table 8 indicate that the baseline findings are
robust to this adjustment.
5. Conclusion
Our empirical results challenge the view that asset management firms go public to en-
hance investment performance. They indicate that, for an asset management firm, the pro-
cess of going public separates investment capital from ownership and control, heightening
conflicts of interest, which are in turn associated with poorer performance.
We show that hedge funds managed by listed asset management firms consistently under-
perform funds managed by their unlisted competitors after adjusting for risk. The results
are linked to problems that surface from the separation of control and investment capital in
a publicly listed firm. Hedge funds that align management and investment capital, such as
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funds with high manager total deltas, better governance, and manager co-investment, under-
perform less when their management companies go public. The results are also associated
with problems that spring from the separation of ownership and investment capital. Asset
management firms that are especially prone to short-termist pressures from shareholders
under-perform more than do firms that are insulated from such pressures. Consistent with
the overall conflicts of interest view, listed management firms with greater separation of
ownership, control, and investment capital exhibit more acute under-performance. Relative
to funds managed by unlisted firms, those managed by listed firms with low insider ownership
and founders who cashed out under-perform more. The conflicts of interest at hedge funds
managed by listed firms translate into a tendency to raise capital by growing the AUM
of existing and new products. These capital raising activities in turn are associated with
under-performance. We show that funds that have the greatest scope for asset gathering, as a
consequence of their low liquidity risk levels, also exhibit the most severe under-performance.
The empirical results in this paper enrich our understanding of agency forces at work
in the asset management industry. While our work highlights the conflicts of interest that
accompany listings of asset management firms, it is important to emphasize that benefits to
public listings exist. The capital raised via the IPO can allow firms to market to investors in
different geographical regions or make the necessary investments to launch new funds that
engage in novel investment strategies. Shareholders benefit from the greater fee revenues
generated via the growth of new and existing fund products at listed firms. Fund investors
can also derive value from the launch of new funds. Through the new products, they can
access different investment strategies and markets with minimal switching costs. Fund in-
vestors can appreciate the increased transparency at listed investment management firms.
For these reasons, notwithstanding their under-performance, the proportion of industry as-
sets managed by public hedge funds could well continue to grow going forward.
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns of hedge funds managed by listed firms versus hedge funds managed
by unlisted firms. Equal-weighted portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds based on
whether they are managed by listed firms. Cumulative abnormal return is the cumulative difference between
a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. Factor
loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Listed versus
unlisted firms by year
Listed
firms
Unlisted
firms
Year Number
of man-
agement
companies
Number
of hedge
funds
Total
AUM
(mil-
lions of
dollars)
Number
of man-
age-
ment
compa-
nies
Number
of
hedge
funds
Total
AUM
(mil-
lions of
dollars)
1994 12 39 $2,548 789 1,187 $60,808
1995 20 68 $4,241 886 1,423 $78,583
1996 27 86 $6,822 1,087 1,758 $97,291
1997 32 109 $10,949 1,253 2,069 $138,441
1998 34 100 $11,115 1,366 2,275 $148,410
1999 42 124 $17,539 1,400 2,267 $183,196
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2000 49 144 $22,425 1,553 2,590 $210,932
2001 51 156 $27,770 1,682 2,881 $261,629
2002 57 184 $25,256 1,769 3,034 $289,290
2003 65 245 $35,956 1,999 3,522 $421,120
2004 72 295 $53,008 2,215 4,021 $571,768
2005 83 328 $60,948 2,404 4,466 $633,386
2006 100 427 $86,705 2,517 4,652 $834,923
2007 111 523 $123,558 2,567 4,746 $1,041,548
2008 109 451 $75,800 2,362 4,157 $710,135
2009 115 543 $99,171 2,372 4,109 $721,271
2010 110 584 $104,829 2,252 3,915 $811,890
2011 110 700 $125,195 2,047 3,590 $823,782
2012 118 873 $169,988 2,197 3,915 $916,657
2013 113 856 $199,335 2,083 3,662 $995,804
Panel B: Listed versus
unlisted firms by in-
vestment strategy
Listed
firms
Unlisted
firms
Fund strategy Number
of hedge
funds
Percentage
of hedge
funds
Number
of
hedge
funds
Percentage
of hedge
funds
Commodity Trading
Advisors
87 6.83 1,187 93.17
Emerging Markets 142 16.80 703 83.20
Event Driven 84 7.38 1,054 92.62
Global Macro 159 9.19 1,571 90.81
Long Only 56 29.47 134 70.53
Long/Short 494 9.56 4,674 90.44
Market Neutral 58 13.84 361 86.16
Multi-Strategy 425 24.93 1,280 75.07
Relative Value 243 11.08 1,951 88.92
Sector 43 14.10 262 85.90
Short Bias 3 8.57 32 91.43
Others 32 9.20 316 90.80
Total 1,826 11.89 13,525 88.11
This table reports the number of hedge funds and the total hedge fund assets under
management (AUM) managed by listed firms and by unlisted firms in each year (Panel A),
and the number and percentage of funds managed by listed firms and by unlisted firms in
each investment style (Panel B). We determine fund management company public listing
status by leveraging on several sources: Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ, the Security
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website, Factiva,
36
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
and the fund management companies’ websites. For each fund management company, we
perform a search in S&P Capital IQ and SEC’s Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, which
provide information about the company’s current and prior corporate parents. Once we
identify a parent and subsidiary relation, we obtain the effective public listing date for
the fund management company by checking the M&A/Private Placements section in S&P
Capital IQ, conducting a Factiva news search, and perusing the corporate history from the
fund management company’s website. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013.
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Table 4: Event study with difference-in-differences analysis
Attribute Before After After - before
Panel A: Hedge fund attributes
Fund alpha (percent / month), treat-
ment group
0.82 -0.11 -0.93** (-2.81)
Fund alpha (percent / month), control
group
0.53 0.30 -0.23 (-1.18)
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.29 -0.41 -0.70** (-2.66)
Fund AUM (millions of US dollars),
treatment group
270.03 484.97 214.94** (10.75)
Fund AUM (millions of US dollars),
control group
289.38 419.91 130.53** (9.38)
Difference in AUM (millions of US dol-
lars)
-19.35 65.06 84.41** (9.79)
Panel B: Fund management company
attributes
Firm alpha (percent / month), treat-
ment group
0.65 -0.08 -0.73** (-3.96)
Firm alpha (percent / month), control
group
0.29 0.17 -0.12 (-0.79)
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.36 -0.24 -0.60** (-3.12)
Firm AUM (millions of US dollars),
treatment group
796.73 1,914.08 1117.35** (16.71)
Firm AUM (millions of US dollars),
control group
789.09 1,288.80 499.71** (10.86)
Difference in AUM (millions of US dol-
lars)
7.65 625.27 617.62** (14.49)
Firm fee revenue (millions of US dollars
/ month), treatment group
2.62 4.30 1.68** (9.94)
Firm fee revenue (millions of US dollars
/ month), control group
2.55 2.80 0.25 (1.98)
Difference in fee revenue (millions of US
dollars / month)
0.06 1.50 1.44** (12.44)
Firm number of funds, treatment group 4.26 8.21 3.95** (28.88)
Firm number of funds, control group 3.84 3.61 -0.23 (-1.30)
Difference in number of funds 0.42 4.61 4.19** (23.94)
This table reports results from an event study analysis of hedge fund and firm attributes
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around a fund management company’s public listing date. Alpha is Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor monthly alpha with factor loadings estimated over the last 24 months. Event
month is the month that the fund management company completes its initial public offering
(IPO). The period ’before’ is the 60-month period before the event month and the period
’after’ is the 60-month period after the event month. To be included in the analysis, a hedge
fund or a hedge fund management company must survive at least 36 months before and after
the event month. Funds and firms in the control group are matched to funds and firms in the
treatment group based on fund alpha, fund assets under management (AUM), firm alpha,
firm AUM, firm fee revenue or the number of funds managed by the firm in the 36-month
pre-event period. For example, in the fund alpha analysis, funds in the control group are
matched to funds in the treatment group by minimizing the sum of the absolute differences
in monthly fund alpha in the 36-month pre-event period. Panel A reports results at hedge
fund level and Panel B reports results at the fund management company level. The sample
period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Denotes significance at the 5% level; **
Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Probit model on launching new funds
Dependent variable: NEWFUNDLAUNCHDe-
pendent variable: NEWFUNDLAUNCHDepen-
dent variable: NEWFUNDLAUNCH
Independent variable (1) (2)
LISTED 0.210** 0.201*
(2.94) (2.43)
[0.0327] [0.0316]
RETURN (percent)RETURN
(percent)RETURN (percent)
0.001
(0.36)
ALPHA (percent)ALPHA (per-
cent)ALPHA (percent)
0.003
(0.80)
NFUNDS 0.089** 0.086**
(12.77) (12.54)
FLOW -0.000 0.002
(-1.11) (0.67)
MGTFEE (percent)MGTFEE
(percent)
0.030 0.037
(1.33) (1.31)
PERFFEE (percent)PERFFEE
(percent)
0.001 0.002
(0.40) (0.61)
NOTICE (months)NOTICE
(months)
-0.039** -0.032**
(-5.53) (-4.10)
MININV (millions of US dol-
lars)MININV (millions of US dol-
lars)
-0.000 -0.003
(-1.31) (-1.48)
AGE (decades)AGE (decades) -0.319** -0.295**
(-8.80) (-7.25)
log(SIZE)log(SIZE) 0.136** 0.144**
(14.89) (13.31)
RETSTD (percent)RETSTD
(percent)
0.001 0.005
(0.20) (0.61)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.139
Number of observations 26,697 19,227
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This table reports results from two probit regressions that model the probability of
launching new funds for listed and unlisted hedge fund management companies. The depen-
dent variable (NEWFUNDLAUNCH) takes a value of one if the fund management company
launches at least one new fund in the year and zero otherwise. All the independent variables
are taken from previous year-end. The primary independent variable of interest is the listed
dummy (LISTED), which takes a value of one if the hedge fund management company is
a listed firm and zero otherwise. The other independent variables are hedge fund firm net
of fee return from the previous year (RETURN), hedge fund firm rolling alpha from the
previous year (ALPHA), the number of hedge funds managed by the management company
in the previous year (NFUNDS), fund flow to the fund management company in the pre-
vious year (FLOW), firm management fee (MGTFEE), firm performance fee (PERFFEE),
firm redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), firm minimum investment in millions
of US dollars (MININV), natural logarithm of firm size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in mil-
lions of US dollars, firm age in decades (AGE), standard deviation of firm returns in the
previous year (RETSTD) and year dummies. Firm-level metrics such as management fee
are constructed by value-weighting the fund-level metrics for all funds managed by the firm.
The z-statistics, derived from robust standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses.
The marginal effects are in brackets. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013. * Denotes significance at the 5% level; ** Denotes significance at the 1% level. This
table reports results from two probit regressions that model the probability of launching new
funds for listed and unlisted hedge fund management companies. The dependent variable
(NEWFUNDLAUNCH) takes a value of one if the fund management company launches at
least one new fund in the year and zero otherwise. All the independent variables are taken
from previous year-end. The primary independent variable of interest is the listed dummy
(LISTED), which takes a value of one if the hedge fund management company is a listed
firm and zero otherwise. The other independent variables are hedge fund firm net of fee
return from the previous year (RETURN), hedge fund firm rolling alpha from the previ-
ous year (ALPHA), the number of hedge funds managed by the management company in
the previous year (NFUNDS), fund flow to the fund management company in the previous
year (FLOW), firm management fee (MGTFEE), firm performance fee (PERFFEE), firm
redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), firm minimum investment in millions of US
dollars (MININV), natural logarithm of firm size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in millions of
US dollars, firm age in decades (AGE), standard deviation of firm returns in the previous
year (RETSTD) and year dummies. Firm-level metrics such as management fee are con-
structed by value-weighting the fund-level metrics for all funds managed by the firm. The
z-statistics, derived from robust standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. The
marginal effects are in brackets. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
* Denotes significance at the 5% level; ** Denotes significance at the 1% level. This ta-
ble reports results from two probit regressions that model the probability of launching new
funds for listed and unlisted hedge fund management companies. The dependent variable
(NEWFUNDLAUNCH) takes a value of one if the fund management company launches at
least one new fund in the year and zero otherwise. All the independent variables are taken
from previous year-end. The primary independent variable of interest is the listed dummy
(LISTED), which takes a value of one if the hedge fund management company is a listed
firm and zero otherwise. The other independent variables are hedge fund firm net of fee
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return from the previous year (RETURN), hedge fund firm rolling alpha from the previ-
ous year (ALPHA), the number of hedge funds managed by the management company in
the previous year (NFUNDS), fund flow to the fund management company in the previous
year (FLOW), firm management fee (MGTFEE), firm performance fee (PERFFEE), firm
redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), firm minimum investment in millions of US
dollars (MININV), natural logarithm of firm size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in millions of
US dollars, firm age in decades (AGE), standard deviation of firm returns in the previous
year (RETSTD) and year dummies. Firm-level metrics such as management fee are con-
structed by value-weighting the fund-level metrics for all funds managed by the firm. The
z-statistics, derived from robust standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. The
marginal effects are in brackets. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
* Denotes significance at the 5% level; ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Portfolio sorts on fund management company listing status and conflicts of interests
Portfolio Excess return Alpha
Panel A: Sort on
managerial total delta
scaled by fund AUM
Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge
funds managed by
listed firms)
3.89(1.83) 6.02** (3.14) 0.38 (0.31) 3.03** (2.49)
Portfolio B (hedge
funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.56** (4.25) 6.44** (3.71) 4.29** (5.16) 3.90** (4.20)
Spread portfolio (A -
B)
-2.67** (-3.46) -0.42 (-0.72) -3.90** (-6.44) -0.87 (-1.42)
Panel B: Sort on fund
aggregate governance
score
Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge
funds managed by
listed firms)
1.18 (0.59) 6.88** (3.78) -1.79 (-1.04) 3.93** (4.49)
Portfolio B (hedge
funds managed by
unlisted firms)
4.62** (2.78) 7.65** (4.24) 1.87 (1.53) 5.21** (6.98)
Spread portfolio (A -
B)
-3.43** (-3.18) -0.77 (-1.31) -3.66** (-3.47) -1.28* (-2.08)
Panel C: Sort on fund
manager personal cap-
ital
No Yes No Yes
Portfolio A (hedge
funds managed by
listed firms)
4.38 (1.50) 6.99** (3.31) -0.88 (-0.39) 4.01** (2.73)
Portfolio B (hedge
funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.89** (2.81) 8.51** (3.54) 2.74 (1.87) 4.56** (3.72)
Spread portfolio (A -
B)
-2.51* (-2.32) -1.52 (-1.35) -3.62** (-3.00) -0.55 (-0.61)
Panel D: Listed firms
sorted by level of in-
sider ownership
Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge
funds managed by
listed firms)
3.60 (1.03) 7.24 (1.10) 0.42 (0.21) 3.04 (0.87)
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Portfolio B (hedge
funds managed by
unlisted firms)
5.28 (1.67) 5.28 (1.67) 2.99 (1.91) 2.99 (1.91)
Spread portfolio (A -
B)
-1.69 (-1.97) 1.96 (0.54) -2.58** (-3.16) 0.05 (0.02)
Panel E: Listed firms
sorted by proportion
of closely held shares
Low High Low High
Portfolio A (hedge
funds managed by
listed firms)
3.74* (2.03) 5.48* (2.46) 0.58 (0.51) 1.71 (1.25)
Portfolio B (hedge
funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.53** (4.20) 6.53** (4.20) 4.02** (4.86) 4.02** (4.86)
Spread portfolio (A -
B)
-2.79** (-4.19) -1.05 (-0.99) -3.44** (-5.07) -2.31** (-2.67)
Panel F: Listed firms
sorted by whether
existing shareholders
cashed out
Yes No Yes No
Portfolio A (hedge
funds managed by
listed firms)
3.48(0.74) 4.90(1.85) -1.50(-0.58) 2.80*(2.35)
Portfolio B (hedge
funds managed by
unlisted firms)
5.60(1.97) 5.60(1.97) 3.08*(2.09) 3.08*(2.09)
Spread portfolio (A -
B)
-2.12(-0.94) -0.71(-0.86) -4.58**(-2.86) -0.27(-0.35)
This table reports double-sorts on firm listing status and fund or firm agency proxies. In
Panel A, hedge funds are first sorted into two groups based on fund manager total delta scaled
by fund assets under management (AUM) (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009) computed over
the previous year. In Panel B, hedge funds are first sorted into two groups based on their
aggregate governance scores (Ozik and Sadka, 2015). As per Ozik and Sadka (2015), high
aggregate governance funds are funds with aggregate governance scores = 4 (out of 5), and
low aggregate governance funds are funds with aggregate governance scores = 1 (out of 5).
In Panel C, hedge funds are first sorted into two groups based on whether the hedge fund
manager co-invests in the fund, as measured by the personal capital dummy from the TASS
database. Next, funds within each agency metric group are stratified into two portfolios by
their fund management company listing status. Portfolio A is the portfolio of hedge funds
managed by listed firms. Portfolio B is the portfolio of hedge funds managed by unlisted
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firms. In Panels D and E, hedge funds managed by listed firms are sorted based on the level
of insider ownership and the number of closely held shares as a proportion of total shares
outstanding, respectively. In Panel F, hedge funds managed by listed firms are sorted based
on whether their initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses reveal that existing shareholders
are cashing out. Information on the level of insider ownership is obtained for listed firms from
their Form ADV Schedule A and B filings. Information on the number of closely held shares
is obtained from Datastream. IPO prospectuses are obtained from the Perfect Information
filings database. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. The effective
sample period differs across panels as we also require that each portfolio has at least ten
funds. * Denotes significance at the 5% level; ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Instrumental variable (IV) analysis
IV first stage
(probit)
IV second
stage
OLS
LISTED RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LISTED -1.420** -1.502** -0.150* -0.185*
(-3.95) (-3.48) (-2.32) (-2.41)
MGTFEE (per-
cent)MGTFEE (percent)
-0.051 0.043* 0.048* 0.047* 0.051*
(-0.56) (2.19) (2.18) (2.44) (2.41)
PERFFEE (per-
cent)PERFFEE (percent)
0.021** 0.001 0.011** 0.000 0.010**
(2.71) (0.54) (5.21) (0.03) (4.85)
NOTICE
(months)NOTICE
(months)
-0.161** 0.004 0.008 0.009* 0.013**
(-3.53) (0.92) (1.95) (2.28) (3.40)
MININV (millions of US
dollars)MININV (millions
of US dollars)
-0.027 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.010
(-0.89) (0.59) (1.44) (1.13) (1.84)
log(SIZE) 0.182** 0.011 0.018** -0.001 0.006
(6.78) (1.76) (2.59) (-0.10) (1.04)
AGE (decades) -0.216 -0.061* -0.093** -0.051 -0.083**
(-1.45) (-1.98) (-2.83) (-1.74) (-2.64)
STRATEGYFLOW 0.039**
(5.64)
F-test: STRATEGYFLOW
= 0
31.81**
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Strategy dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.144
R-squared 0.032 0.007
Adj. R-squared 0.034 0.010
Number of observations 257,682 257,682 257,682 257,682 257,682
This table reports results from regressions that use an instrumental variable approach
to examine whether the observed differences in hedge fund performance between listed and
unlisted hedge fund firms reflect unobserved differences that endogenously determine listing
status. Our instrument for listing status exploits the cross sectional differences in hedge
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fund managers’ ability to accumulate capital at the time of founding. We define hedge fund
management company founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) as fund manager’s
strategy fund flow over the 24-month period after inception. The strategy used in STRATE-
GYFLOW corresponds to the investment strategy of the first fund launched by the firm. We
exclude all listed hedge fund firms that go public less than two years after inception. Column
1 shows the first stage probit model of hedge fund listing status on hedge fund management
company founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) and the group of control vari-
ables used in Table 3. The dependent variable is the listed dummy (LISTED), which takes a
value of one if the hedge fund management company is a listed firm, and a value of zero oth-
erwise. The independent variables are hedge fund management fee (MGTFEE), performance
fee (PERFFEE), redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), minimum investment in
millions of US dollars (MININV), the natural logarithm of fund size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE
is in millions of US dollars, fund age in decades (AGE) and dummy variables for year and
fund investment strategy. Following Wooldridge (2010), the second stage is estimated by
generalized method of moments (GMM) using as instruments the first-stage predicted prob-
ability. Columns 2 and 3 show the second stage results, where the dependent variables are
RETURN and ALPHA. RETURN is hedge fund monthly net of fee return. ALPHA is Fung
and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha, with factor loadings estimated over the last 24
months. For comparison, Columns 4 and 5 report results from regressions analogous to those
reported in Columns 2 and 3 but without instrumenting for hedge fund listing status. In
Columns 1, 2, and 3, z-statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered by fund are in
parentheses. In Columns 4 and 5, t-statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered
by fund are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * De-
notes significance at the 5% level; ** Denotes significance at the 1% level. This table reports
results from regressions that use an instrumental variable approach to examine whether the
observed differences in hedge fund performance between listed and unlisted hedge fund firms
reflect unobserved differences that endogenously determine listing status. Our instrument
for listing status exploits the cross sectional differences in hedge fund managers’ ability to
accumulate capital at the time of founding. We define hedge fund management company
founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) as fund manager’s strategy fund flow over
the 24-month period after inception. The strategy used in STRATEGYFLOW corresponds
to the investment strategy of the first fund launched by the firm. We exclude all listed
hedge fund firms that go public less than two years after inception. Column 1 shows the
first stage probit model of hedge fund listing status on hedge fund management company
founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) and the group of control variables used
in Table 3. The dependent variable is the listed dummy (LISTED), which takes a value
of one if the hedge fund management company is a listed firm, and a value of zero other-
wise. The independent variables are hedge fund management fee (MGTFEE), performance
fee (PERFFEE), redemption notice period in months (NOTICE), minimum investment in
millions of US dollars (MININV), the natural logarithm of fund size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE
is in millions of US dollars, fund age in decades (AGE) and dummy variables for year and
fund investment strategy. Following Wooldridge (2010), the second stage is estimated by
generalized method of moments (GMM) using as instruments the first-stage predicted prob-
ability. Columns 2 and 3 show the second stage results, where the dependent variables are
RETURN and ALPHA. RETURN is hedge fund monthly net of fee return. ALPHA is Fung
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and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor monthly alpha, with factor loadings estimated over the last
24 months. For comparison, Columns 4 and 5 report results from regressions analogous to
those reported in Columns 2 and 3 but without instrumenting for hedge fund listing status.
In Columns 1, 2, and 3, z-statistics derived from robust standard errors clustered by fund
are in parentheses. In Columns 4 and 5, t-statistics derived from robust standard errors
clustered by fund are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013. * Denotes significance at the 5% level; ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 8: Robustness tests
Portfolio Excess Return
(percent / year)
Alpha (percent /
year)
Adj. R-squared
Panel A: Adjusted for backfill bias
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
2.47 (1.31) -0.62 (-0.53) 0.55
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
4.79** (2.87) 2.19** (2.68) 0.70
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.32** (-3.01) -2.81** (-3.72) 0.05
Panel B: Adjusted for serial correlation
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.29* (2.41) 0.96 (0.87) 0.60
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.18** (4.32) 3.86** (4.93) 0.64
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89** (-3.13) -2.89** (-5.18) 0.22
Panel C: Pre-fee returns
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
7.15** (3.95) 3.83** (3.70) 0.62
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
9.79** (6.66) 7.47** (9.34) 0.63
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.64** (-4.55) -3.64** (-6.43) 0.24
Panel D: Adjusted for dynamic risk ex-
posures using 24-month rolling betas
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.49* (2.32) 0.02 (0.02) n.a.
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.53** (4.20) 3.44** (3.69) n.a.
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.05** (-3.31) -3.42** (-4.92) n.a.
Panel E: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
augmented with an emerging markets
equity factor
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.29* (2.41) 1.68 (1.93) 0.74
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.18** (4.32) 4.32** (6.45) 0.73
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89** (-3.13) -2.64** (-4.61) 0.32
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Panel F: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
augmented with the Agarwal and Naik
(2004) out-of-the money call and put
option factors
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.29* (2.41) 2.46* (2.41) 0.66
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.18** (4.32) 4.56** (5.16) 0.63
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89** (-3.13) -2.10** (-3.51) 0.25
Panel G: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
augmented with the Pstor and Stam-
baugh (2003) liquidity factor
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.29* (2.41) 0.93 (0.80) 0.60
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.18** (4.32) 4.28** (5.10) 0.64
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.89** (-3.13) -3.35** (-5.10) 0.23
Panel H: Adjusted for fund termination
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
2.84 (1.61) -0.40 (-0.38) 0.59
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
4.61** (3.23) 2.31** (3.00) 0.64
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.77** (-2.95) -2.72** (-4.45) 0.21
Panel I: Subsample analysis (January
1994 December 2003)
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.46* (2.44) 1.58 (1.59) 0.72
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
6.59** (4.15) 4.55** (5.25) 0.69
Spread portfolio (A - B) -2.12** (-2.94) -2.97** (-3.63) 0.21
Panel J: Subsample analysis (January
2004 December 2013)
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
4.11 (1.35) -0.25 (-0.13) 0.57
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
5.77* (2.43) 2.82* (2.22) 0.66
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.66 (-1.71) -3.07** (-3.17) 0.21
Panel K: Management company re-
turns constructed from 13F stock hold-
ings
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Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
9.19* (2.28) 1.56 (1.83) 0.88
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
12.01** (2.61) 3.73** (3.85) 0.95
Spread portfolio (A - B) -4.67* (-1.94) -2.17* (-2.36) 0.38
Panel L: Style-adjusted returns
Portfolio A (hedge funds managed by
listed firms)
-1.65** (-4.45) -2.24** (-6.02) 0.23
Portfolio B (hedge funds managed by
unlisted firms)
-0.34** (-3.16) -0.23 (-1.92) 0.06
Spread portfolio (A - B) -1.31** (-2.98) -2.01** (-4.41) 0.22
This table reports robustness tests on the baseline portfolio sorts. Every January, hedge
funds are sorted into two portfolios based on whether they are managed by listed firms or by
unlisted firms. The post-formation returns on these two portfolios over the next 12 months
are linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio. Portfolio A is the
portfolio of hedge funds managed by listed firms. Portfolio B is the portfolio of hedge funds
managed by unlisted firms. Panel A reports results adjusted for backfill bias by removing
the return observations before fund listing date. Panel B reports results after unsmoothing
returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) algorithm. Panel C reports results
after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns. Panel D reports results adjusted for dynamic
risk exposures by using a rolling 24-month window to calculate factor loadings. Panel E
reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the MSCI Emerging
Market Index excess return. Panel F reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model with the Agarwal and Naik (2004) out-of-the money call and put option factors.
Panel G reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Pstor
and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Panel H adjusts for fund termination by assuming
that a fund delivers a -10% return for the month after it liquidates. Panels I and J report
results for two subsample periods: January 1994 to December 2003 and January 2004 to
December 2013, respectively. Panel K reports results with firm returns computed from
Thomson Financial 13F stock holdings. Panel L reports results with style-adjusted returns.
The t-statistics, derived from White (1980) standard errors, are in parentheses. The sample
period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Denotes significance at the 5% level; **
Denotes significance at the 1% level.
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